



The University of Western Ontario
HISTORY 9417A
Europe since the Second World War:
Selected Subjects and Debates
Fall 2025

Instructor: Eli Nathans

Office Hours: Wednesdays 1:30-3:30
Department of History, Office: Lawson Hall 2217
Email: enathans@uwo.ca

This is a draft of the course syllabus. The final version will be available to students before the start of classes in September.

Course Description:

The assigned texts were selected to introduce students to a range of subjects, questions, and methods in the larger field of post-1945 European history. No claim is made to comprehensiveness of coverage. The readings draw from a range of sub-specialties within history as well as from works by political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, economists, and journalists. Many contain voices and perspectives of Europeans outside any of these professions. History does not belong only to the historical profession, or to the academy, especially when the subject is such a recent period. The course is designed to stimulate reflection regarding students' own historical agendas and the approaches they propose to take in their own work. It is also designed to increase understanding of European history in the period studied.

The issues on which the course focuses are, in the order considered in the course: the forms taken by, the reasons for, and the consequences of, the end of formal European empires, with a focus on Britain; integration, and failures to integrate, minority groups into larger societies, both within the context of migration to Britain from colonies and former colonies and in Poland in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, with respect to its tiny Jewish minority; the nature of, and reasons for, class differences, the effects of these differences on life chances and choices, and how class differences have changed in the period we examine; the characteristics of Soviet society in the 1980s, as revealed by popular responses to the explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in 1986; the challenges West European societies faced as a result of the end of the twenty-five years of extraordinary period of economic growth and prosperity following the Second World War, with a focus on the admittedly extreme case of Italy; the reasons for the growing attraction of right-wing populist parties from the 1990s, in almost all European countries, and the ways in which these parties have governed when given the opportunity to do so; how European states and societies have integrated, and failed to integrate, Muslim immigrants, and more generally the challenges the growth in the Muslim population of Europe has posed for European countries and for European Muslims; and recent comparative studies of the distinctive characteristics of arguably the most successful of the European economies, that of Germany.

As this list indicates, the course has an eclectic, perhaps even kaleidoscopic, character. The subjects covered do not fit seamlessly together. In the period we examine Europeans had a diversity of experiences and concerns, based on the country in which they lived, the ethnic and religious groups to which they belonged, their class and gender, and many other factors. The eclectic and kaleidoscopic nature of the class reflects the reality of the history of the period on which we focus. I have chosen subjects that are in themselves intrinsically significant, in that they affected the lives of many millions of Europeans in fundamental ways. Each has a large literature, which we only sample. I have prioritized literature that is empirically grounded, in the sense that the books and articles do not just generalize or theorize - although there are a couple theorists in the mix - but draw heavily on empirical evidence, enabling the reader to judge the arguments made on the basis of evidence. You will find a number of the assigned texts themselves contain conflicting points of view. Sources were chosen in part to present alternative points of view.

I should also provide what is sometimes called a trigger warning. The subjects on which a significant number of the assigned texts focus are disturbing. This is most evident when the subject is physical violence, sometimes involving killing, as in the texts that examine the treatment of Jews in Polish society in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and Islamist terrorism in Europe, or other forms of death and maiming described in the assigned book on the Chernobyl reactor explosion. Students may find the prejudices and lies of right-wing populists read in the second half of the term deeply disturbing, and the same is true of the demeaning treatment of Black and other minorities in Britain in the twentieth century. It is impossible to study modern European history honestly without examining these realities. My goal is to approach these and other issues in an empirical and sober way. The academy exists in part to provide a venue to examine difficult subjects. But students should be aware in advance that I assign material that is disturbing.

Students who have not studied this period in history are urged to read at least parts of Tony Judt's *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005). Please note that the first class will start with a discussion of the assigned texts. Please read these texts before the class. The assigned excerpts can be found in the course OWL website.

Graduate Course Level Learning Outcomes/Objectives:

Students who successfully complete this course will be able to:

demonstrate an understanding of the subjects of European history that it examines, including the reasons for decolonization of European empires; postwar migration to Britain and antisemitism in Poland in the immediate postwar period; the forms taken by inequality in postwar Western Europe and the effects of inequality on individual life chances and choices; what the responses to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of those living in the vicinity of the reactor can teach about the nature of Soviet society in the last decade of the existence of the Soviet Union; the challenges clientism and corruption posed to the Italian state and Italian society, especially from the 1980s; the reasons for the growing support for populism in European countries from the 1990s; and the responses of European societies to the immigration of Muslims since the 1960s, and European Muslims' responses to European societies;

explain and evaluate key differences in the ways the subjects described above were experienced by those affected and the different interpretations of authors from a range of disciplines;

articulate and defend interpretations of the above subjects in class discussions and in assigned response papers and essays.

Course Timeline and Format

Please see the course schedule below.

Enrollment Restrictions

Enrollment in this course is restricted to graduate students in History, as well as any student that has obtained special permission to enroll in this course from the course instructor as well as the Graduate Chair (or equivalent) from the student's home program. Please contact Kara Brown, the graduate program coordinator (kbrow@uwo.ca) if you are in a department other than History and would like to enroll in the course.

Course Syllabus:

Please see methods of evaluation discussion below.

Course Materials:

The following book should be purchased at the Western bookstore:

Paul Lendvai, *Orban, Europe's New Strongman* (Oxford University Press, 2018). **This required book is being sold by the Western Bookstore for \$37.25 plus tax. Information about book prices and availability can also be found at the Western Bookstore's website for the class, found at [textbook prices](#). Students are welcome to purchase second-hand or earlier editions of this book.**

Other texts are linked on the course OWL Brightspace website, on the sites for each week of the course. Many of the articles, and a few of the books, can be accessed on-line, through Western Libraries. The instructor will supply copies of Jan Gross, *Fear. Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpretation*; Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-first Century*; Svetlana Alexievich's *Voices from Chernobyl. The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster*; Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and its Discontents. Family, Civil Society, State, 1980-2001*; Alison Pargeter, *The New Frontiers of Jihad*; Ayaan Hirsi Ali, *Infidel*, and Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam*.

Methods of Evaluation:

Two-to-three-page responses to questions in the syllabus regarding the assigned readings, due in the instructor's mailbox or sent to the instructor as an attachment (in Word) to an email by 3:00 pm on the Wednesday before each class. Response papers are not accepted after the start of the class.

15%

Participation in class discussions

25%

Presentation to the class:

10%

Students are asked to make one twenty-minute presentation at the start of one class. The presentation should analyze the key arguments of the assigned texts, take a position with respect to them, and suggest questions for discussion. Students will be asked to indicate their preferences for presentations in an

email to the instructor after the first class. Students should plan on presenting a dry-run of the presentation to the instructor for feedback during the afternoon of Tuesday or Wednesday before the class in which the presentation will take place. Please do not use Power Points with the presentation.

Two eight-to-ten-page essays on the assigned materials (each 25% of the course grade). **The essays are due in class on the day the subject is to be discussed. Essays will not be accepted after the end of the class period on that day. If you are unable to meet this deadline, please select a different subject for your essay. Please write at least one of these essays by the end of week six of the course. Ten percent of the grade will be deducted from the grade of the first essay submitted if it is not submitted during the first six weeks of the class. The penalty will be waived if the student obtains an accommodation. Neither of the two essays should focus on the subject on which the student is making a class presentation. Please use standard footnote form in your essays.**

50%

The response papers should demonstrate that students have read the assigned documents and thought about the key issues that they raise. There is no need for footnotes.

Students are expected to participate in class discussions. Participation grades will be based on responses to questions posed in class and other contributions that reflect a careful reading of, and reflection regarding, the assigned texts. The quality of the contribution is more important than the number of contributions made in each class. Attendance without participation, or if participation does not reflect a reading of the assigned texts, will be assigned a grade of 40.

In calculating the grades for the responses to the assigned readings and for participation in class discussions, the instructor will exclude the lowest of the grades in each category. This means that if a student needs to miss one class, this will not be penalized; the grade for this class will be dropped. Further absences will require an accommodation as provided by Western regulations in order to avoid a mark of zero for class participation.

Students will be asked to make one class presentation based on the assigned readings; on the day the readings are to be discussed. Students will read drafts of their presentations to the instructor on Tuesday or Wednesday before the presentation is to be made. The instructor will offer suggestions for improvement. Students will be graded entirely on the content of the final presentations, which should last for no more than twenty minutes - the time limit will be strictly enforced. Presentations should not be made on the same subject that a student has chosen for either of the two assigned essays.

Students are expected to attend all classes except when prevented from doing so by illness or other emergencies.

Course Schedule and Readings:

Please note that I have listed the readings for each week in the order in which I suggest that you read them.

A slow retreat from empire, abroad and at home: Britain 1945-1968

September 4: **Abroad**

William Roger Louis, "The Dissolution of the British Empire," in *The Twentieth Century*, ed. by Judith Brown, vol. 4 of *The Oxford History of the British Empire* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 358-385.

J.C Hurewitz, "The Historical Context," in *Suez 1956 : the crisis and its consequences*, ed. by William Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford, 1989), 19-30.

Keith Kyle, "Britain and the Crisis, 1955-1956," in *Suez 1956 : the crisis and its consequences*, ed. by Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford, 1989), 103-130.

John Darwin, "Decolonization and the End of Empire," in *Historiography*, ed. by Robin Winks, vol. 5 of *The Oxford History of the British Empire* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 541-557.

Both Louis and Hurewitz sketch the goals of British officials in managing relations with colonies and former colonies in the period between 1945 and 1960. What were their principal objectives, and what methods did they advocate to accomplish these objectives?

Kyle's essay describes the process by which the British government, led by Eden, decided to make war on Egypt to regain control of the Suez Canal. What were the most important factors that contributed to this decision?

Of the various factors discussed by Darwin in explaining the larger process of decolonization, which find the most support in the analyses of Louis, Hurewitz, and Kyle?

September 11 **At home: British Citizenship Policies and Immigration to Great Britain, 1945-1968**

Winston James, "The Black Experience in Twentieth Century Britain," in *The Black Experience and the Empire*, in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Companion Series* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 347-86.

Zig Layton-Henry, *The Politics of Race in Britain* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), xiii-xvi, 10-74.

Wendy Webster, *Englishness and Empire 1939-1965* (Oxford, 2005), 171-81. (from the chapter on immigration, subsection "The Commonwealth and Immigrants")

Camilla Schofield, *Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1-39, 71-139.

What attitudes towards Black migrants does Winston James find were most prevalent in Britain in the period he examines? What factors led to changes, sometimes temporary, in popular and elite attitudes? How did migrating to Britain, and the experience of living there, change Black Britons?

What factors determined the form taken by British citizenship and immigration policies in the period between 1945 and 1970? Why did the British government, under the leadership of both the Labour and Conservative parties, initially continue to support granting the citizens of all Commonwealth nations the status of British subject, including the right to migrate to Great Britain? Why did official policy change dramatically after 1960?

Is Schofield's argument, between pages 3 and 8, that Powell's politics can be distinguished from fascism because they were "grounded in a distinctively English, postwar and *postcolonial* version of nationalism," convincing? (p. 3) Did Powell's "belief in the necessity of allegiance to the Crown" mean that his version of nationalism was not fascist? What supposedly "made Powell's understanding of race . . . Tory in character"? (p. 6) How can one account for Powell's supposed fear of the "break-up of institutional and social structure of authority of a post-imperial Britain"? (p. 12) What connections does Schofield draw between the experience of the Second World War and postwar antagonism to Black migration to Britain? (pp. 16-23) On what grounds did Powell oppose the British Nationality Act of 1948? (pp. 90-92) How did Powell respond to the decline of the British Empire between 1948 and 1960? (pp. 92-139)

September 18

Explaining Polish Antisemitism in the Immediate Post-war Period

Jan Gross, *Fear. Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpretation* (New York: Random House, 2006).

Book to be supplied by the instructor.

Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, *After the Holocaust. Polish-Jewish Conflict in the Wake of World War II* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2003), 1-5, 53-62, 103-15, 131-39, 187-99.

Michael Steinlauf, *Bondage to the Dead. Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), preface, 1-61.

Anna Cichopek-Gajraj, *Beyond Violence. Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia, 1944-48* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1-10, 130-45, 179-87, 231-37.

All four authors examine the violence against Polish Jews in Poland in 1945 and 1946, violence that led most of the Jews who had returned to Poland after the defeat of Germany to leave. Are there any facts or interpretations on which the authors agree? What are the most significant differences in the interpretations of these events? Consider the following factors: the role of long-held anti-Semitic sentiments in Polish society; the influence of the German example in making these sentiments even more extreme and depraved, and more generally the brutal experience of German rule; the active part played by some Jews and individuals whose families were Jewish in the Communist administration in those parts of Poland occupied by the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941, and after 1944 in all of Poland; the civil war that took place between supporters and opponents of the new Communist regime in 1945 and 1946, and the general lawlessness of the period; the murder of much of the Polish elite by Nazi Germany, which deprived the country of a significant part of its spiritual leadership; conflicts over property rights created by the return of Polish Jews whose property had been appropriated by non-Jewish Poles; and the positions taken regarding violence against Jews by leaders of the Catholic Church in Poland.

Inequality in postwar Europe

September 25

The continuing significance of class, as described by Pierre Bourdieu

Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Harvard University Press, 1991), 12-25 (introduction by John B. Thompson)

Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Harvard University Press, 1996), 99-119, 126-31, 142-3, 169-83, 190-93, 208-17.

What are the distinctive characteristics of the disposition, or habitus, as Bourdieu uses the term? What qualities of the habitus interest Bourdieu; what are some of the most significant class-linked characteristics? To what extent does the habitus express an economic logic? Why is the habitus relevant to economic success, that is, perpetuate class distinctions? What are the problems with traditional measures of class, according to Bourdieu? What are the different forms taken by capital, in Bourdieu's account? How does one form of capital become transformed into another?

How does Bourdieu explain what he sees as class-based differences in tastes for food and sports? How does he relate these different tastes, in turn, to different ideals of the body and to class-based conceptions of gender-roles? What roles do distinctions in taste play in the social world Bourdieu describes?

October 2:

Increasing levels of economic inequality from the 1980s, as described by Thomas Piketty

*Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 1-30, 113-50, 164-94, 199-223, 237-376, 493-514.

Book to be supplied by the instructor

Piketty argues that as long as return on capital (r) exceeds the growth rate of the entire economy (g) inequality of wealth will grow, as long as: 1) more of the return from capital is reinvested than the annual growth rate of the economy, 2) governments do not intervene in economies (for example, through income and estate taxes) to reduce inequality. What is the rationale behind this claim? Why was there a deviation from this pattern in the period between the First World War and the 1950s, according to Piketty? What role was played in the growing inequality in the societies on which Piketty focuses by income inequalities? How does Piketty seek to explain this rise in income inequality? (see pages 506-7) How does Piketty respond to claims that rising income inequality is a product of the increasingly specialized skills that managers must possess? What role was played by minimum wage laws in explaining the phenomena that Piketty describes?

October 9: **The Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the end of the Soviet Union**

*Svetlana Alexievich, *Voices from Chernobyl. The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster*, trans. Keith Gessen (New York: Picador, 2006), preface, 1-67, 105-236.

Book to be supplied by the instructor

Svetlana Alexievich, *Secondhand Time. The Last of the Soviets*, trans. Bela Shayevich (New York: Random House, 2016), 3-33, 58-63, 74-77, 99-101, 292-96, 337-49, 454-68.

Alexievich records that a Soviet citizen who was affected by the Chernobyl disaster commented that "everybody became who he really was." (p. 109) What did the experience of Chernobyl reveal about Soviet society? What were this society's principal qualities, as reflected in its response to this disaster? Consider the role of memories of the war, attitudes regarding scientific innovation, the forms taken by solidarity and hierarchy, how the government related to the public, and the roles of widespread inebriation, theft, and lying. And also: how did the experience of Chernobyl change those touched by it?

What are the principal characteristics of post-Soviet society, as the individuals Alexievich interviewed describe it in "Secondhand Time"?

October 16: **Italy: Corruption, Economic Decline, and Authoritarian Populism, 1980-2018**

Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and its Discontents. Family, Civil Society, State, 1980-2001* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), ix-xiv, 1-29, 174-212, 230-234, 249-299, 307-324.

Andrea Lorenzo Capussela, *The Political Economy of Italy's Decline* (Oxford, 2018), 170-220. (available on-line through Western Libraries)

Carlo Bastasin and Gianni Toniolo, *The Rise and Fall of the Italian Economy* (Cambridge, 2023), 127-155.

October 23: **European populism**

Sheri Berman and Maria Snegovaya, "Populism and the Decline of Social Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 30:3 (July 2019), 5-19.

Rogers Brubaker, "Why Populism?," *Theory and Society* 46:5 (2017): 357-85.

Robert Kuttner, *Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism?* (New York: Norton, 2018), 121-48.

Bo Rothstein, "The Shadow of the Swedish Right," *Journal of Democracy* 34:1 (2023): 36-49

Cathrine Thorleifsson, *Nationalist Responses to the Crises in Europe. Old and New Hatreds* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 1-10, 60-88.

Berman and Snegovaya argue that in both Western and Eastern Europe the rise of populist parties was a product of the “the left’s shift to the center on economic issues,” including the promotion of deregulation of the economy, cuts in taxes and social programs, and privatization of the economy. (p. 6) What were the distinctive reasons for, and trajectory of, these changes in Western and Eastern Europe? How did they lead to support for populist parties? Why have West European populist parties focused on what Berman and Snegovaya call “non-economic issues” (p. 11), while in Eastern Europe populist parties “present themselves as champions of the welfare state.” (p. 14)

Brubaker emphasizes different qualities of populist parties, what he calls their “discursive, rhetorical, and stylistic commonalities that cut across substantively quite different forms of politics.” (p. 360) Why does Brubaker find a focus on common repertoire of styles (p. 361) helpful, enlightening, for the study of populism? What does he find distinctive about the populist version of the claim to speak for the people, a claim common to most political parties? (pp. 362-4) Brubaker claims that what is distinctive about populist rhetoric is “the tight discursive interweaving of the vertical opposition to those on top and the horizontal opposition to outside groups or forces.” (p. 363) What does he mean by that claim? Brubaker identifies other common rhetorical emphases of populist parties, most implied by attacks on those above and below the “people,” or in some other way outside them: the demand that public take control of elite institutions insulated from the democratic process (so, the EU) (pp. 364-5); hostility to rights benefiting minorities (p. 365); hostility to established institutions, from the courts to the media to the “deep state” (p. 366); economic, cultural, and physical protectionism (p. 366); and a preference for direct and simple, often coarse, styles of communication. (pp. 366-7) As to why populism has become a significant phenomenon in Europe and North America, Brubaker emphasizes a range of structural changes since the 1960s: the “an ongoing social structural and cultural process of individualization, which has massively eroded the socially encapsulating subcultural boundaries” (p. 369); new mass media conducive to populist styles (p. 370); the increasing complexity and opacity of government (p. 370); growth in immigration from outside of Europe and North America, resulting in greater cultural and ethnic heterogeneity (p. 371), the growth of economic inequality and the decline of manufacturing (p. 371); in Europe the growth in power of the EU, with its “its quasi-constitutional elevation of market freedoms above all other considerations” (p. 372); and stigmatization of opponents of new minority rights (p. 372). Brubaker finds that these structural trends were intensified by a series of crises that began with the Recession of 2008: the debt crisis in Greece and the imposition of austerity by the central bank, the “European refugee crisis of 2015,” (pp. 374-5) what Brubaker calls “the new wave of jihadi militancy” (p. 377) and “the crisis of public knowledge that is suggested by the talk of fake news.” (p. 378)

In what respects is Brubaker’s explanation of the meaning and reasons for the attraction of populism similar to, or different from, those of Berman and Snegovaya? What factors does he emphasize that they do not, and vice versa?

The assigned chapter from Robert Kuttner’s book describes ways in which European Union rules and policies have created conditions that promote the attraction of populist parties. How does Kuttner support his argument that the European Union in many respects is “a lot more like an instrument of

global governance” than a single country? (pp. 121-2) In what respects is this claim accurate, and in what respects unfair, a partial reflection of the reality?

To which of the interpretations of the origins of populism in Europe does Bo Rothstein’s analysis of the growing power and influence of Swedish Democrats give support? What factors does it mention that are not sufficiently emphasized in the more general overviews of the phenomenon?

Thorleifsson explores what right wing populists in Hungary and Sweden between 2015 and 2017 are prepared to say in the presence of a Norwegian anthropologist who looks, at least, like one of the people to whom they want to appeal. What does she conclude?

What was populist about the Northern League, according to Ginsborg?

October 30: **Threats to republican principles in Central and Eastern Europe:
Hungary and Poland**

*Paul Lendvai, *Orban, Europe's New Strongman* (Hurst & Company, London, 2017).
Book to be purchased by students.

Peter Kreko, Zsolt Enyedi, “Orbán’s Laboratory of Illiberalism,” *Journal of Democracy* 29:3 (July 2018): 39-50. Accessed at: <https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/article/698916>

Kim Lane Scheppele, “How Viktor Orbán Wins,” *Journal of Democracy* 33:3 (2022): 45-61. Accessed at <https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/pub/1/article/860244/pdf>

Wojciech Przybylski, “Can Poland’s Backsliding Be Stopped?,” *Journal of Democracy* 29:3 (July 2018): 52-60. Accessed at: <https://muse-jhu-edu.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/article/698917>

Christian Davies, “Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s Courts,” Freedom House (July 2018). Accessed at <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/poland%20brief%20final.pdf>
(the link to the Davies article needs to be copied and pasted manually to work; the article can also be accessed through the Western Libraries catalogue)

Lendvai writes that Orban would not have been able to create his version of authoritarian rule “without the moral bankruptcy of a system mired in corruption and increasingly discredited by political and economic incompetence, crowned by the all too evident failure of the centre-left elite.” (Lendvai, p.52) To what failures and incompetence does Lendvai refer? How did Orban attempt to appeal to Hungarians in the period before 2010, when his party was in the opposition? What methods did Orban use to consolidate power in his own hands? What forms does corruption take in Orban’s Hungary? How can one explain Orban’s sustained attacks on George Soros and the various institutions that he funds? Why have supporters of democracy proven unable more effectively to defend democratic institutions? Consider not only the methods Lendvai describes, but especially the descriptions of

Orban's electoral maneuvers found in the articles by Keko and Enyedi, and Scheppele. Why has the European Union also proven unable significantly to restrain Orban?

How does Przybylski explain what he calls "Poland's backsliding"? What role was played by the economic hardships of the transition from Communist rule and socio-economic divisions within Poland? Why has at least part of Polish society been receptive to the conspiracy theories peddled by Law and Justice? What are the principal similarities and differences between the forms of rule practiced by Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice in Poland?

What characteristic features of populism are found in Fidesz and the Law and Justice Party? Are there any respects in which these parties differ from the other European populist parties that we discussed last week?

November 6 **Fall Break**

Muslim Immigrants in Europe

November 13 **European Muslims and European States and Societies since the 1960s: An Overview**

Oussama Cherribi, "The Growing Islamization of Europe," in *Modernizing Islam. Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe*, John Esposito and Francois Burgat, eds. (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 193-214.

Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, "Muslim-State Relations in Great Britain: An Evolving Story," in *Muslim Minority-State Relations. Violence, Integration, and Policy*, ed. Robert Mason (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 25-49. (Britain)

European Islamophobia Report 2017, Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, Enes Bayrakli and Farid Hafiz, eds. (Istanbul: Turkuvaz Haberlesme ve Yayıncılık, 2018), 4-25, 673-705.

Ayhan Kaya, *Islam and Integration. The Age of Securitization* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 62-4, 75-92. (France)

Nancy Foner and Richard Alba, "Being Muslim in the United States and Western Europe. Why is it different," in *Growing up Muslim in Europe and the United States*, Mehdi Bozorgmehr and Philip Kasinitz, eds. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 21-38.

Britain:

Cherribi writes on page 196 that "Britain and the Netherlands have served as examples to other European countries in how to accommodate the Muslim communities." Meer and Modood for the most part agree. To what government policies and social practices do these authors refer? The assigned chapter from the 2017 report on Islamophobia paints a much darker picture. Among the sectors of

society in which the author, Aristotle find evidence of bias is employment, where he discusses evidence of remarks hostile to Muslims made by politicians, although noting also that the principal British political parties have taken action against some of those responsible, (pp. 677-82); anti-Muslim discrimination in hiring (pp. 683-88); hostile depictions in the media (pp. 688-90); and physical attacks against Muslims or mosques (pp. 690-96). To what extent are these accounts consistent, and to what extent does the 2017 article require revising the claims made by Cherribi, Meer, and Modood?

France:

How can one explain the difference in responses to the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls and women in France, Britain, and the Netherlands? (Cherribi, pp. 196-7; Kaya, 78-81) To what does Kaya attribute the country-wide rioting that took place in France in 2005, whose scope and causes very closely resemble the riots that took place in July 2023? (Kaya, 81-92)

The United States and Europe:

Why, according to Foner and Alba, has the integration of Muslims into the society of the United States taken place with less “contention and conflict” than in West European countries? (p. 22)

November 20 **Islamism and responses; Ayaan Hirsi Ali**

Fouad Laroui, “Democracy and Islam in the Maghreb and Implications for Europe,” in *The Other Muslims. Moderate and Secular*, Zeyno Baran, ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 70-9.

Alison Pargeter, *The New Frontiers of Jihad. Radical Islam in Europe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), introduction, 1-31, 64-92, 98-105, 140-65, 187-209.

Book to be supplied by the instructor.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, *Infidel* (New York: Free Press, 2007), 213-35, 236-47, 267-91

Book to be supplied by the instructor.

Mineka Bosch, ‘Telling Stories, Creating (and Saving) Her Life: An Analysis of the Autobiography of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’, *Women’s Studies International Forum*, 31:2 (2008): 138–47.

Mostafa Hilali, “The Lamp and the Candle,” in *The Other Muslims. Moderate and Secular*, Zeyno Baran, ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 123-35.

Fouad Laroui describes the influence of the mass media, and especially television, from North African countries on emigrants from Morocco and Algeria and their families. Why does he believe this influence is cause for concern?

Pargeter seeks to explain the repeated acts of violence against Europeans by members of radical Muslim organizations, or sometimes by individuals acting on their own, largely as continuations of conflicts taking place in the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, or as a consequence of points of view prevalent in these regions. On which conflicts and attitudes does she focus, and how does she explain their role in creating violence in Europe? What conclusions does she draw for the making of policy?

In her memoirs Hirsi Ali seeks to explain her alienation from Islam. The first part, not assigned, focuses on her experiences in Somalia and then as a political refugee in Saudi Arabia and Kenya. These sections of the memoirs describe the violent hatreds between clans in Somalia that provided the fuel for civil war, what Hirsi Ali describes as the repressive treatment of women in Saudi Arabia, where she lived for a period with her family when fleeing the war, and her own feeling of being restricted and controlled by her own family. Hirsi Ali also describes a period in which she herself was attracted to fundamentalist forms of Islam, from which she had begun to distance herself in the period with which the assignment begins. The assigned reading starts with Hirsi Ali's trip to Germany, on the way to marry the husband chosen for her by her father, a marriage she rejects.

What experiences led Hirsi Ali to become critical of Islam, according to the assigned sections of the memoirs? How does she respond to critics who argue that she ascribes to the entire religion the practices of a minority of its adherents, practices that were the product of local cultures and not of the religion itself?

On what grounds does Mineka Bosch criticize Hirsi Ali's memoir?

How does Mostafa Hilali characterize the responses of Dutch society to him and to his family, as immigrants from Morocco? What is his attitude, and his parents' attitude, to the Netherlands? In what respects does Hilali's account support or call into question Hirsi Ali's account of Islam?

November 27: **Bassam Tibi and Islam in Europe**

Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam* (Yale University Press), viii-xx, 1-30, 94-115, 243-8, 262-5.
Book to be supplied by the instructor.

Tibi's thesis is that "there is a distinction between the faith of Islam and the religionized politics of Islamism, which employs religious symbols for political ends." (p. vii) Explain what Tibi means by this distinction. Why does Tibi consider this distinction so important? What are the chief characteristics of Islamism, in its various forms, as he describes them? To what extent can one criticize Tibi on the same grounds as one can criticize Ayaan Hirsi Ali?

Bassam Tibi, "Euro-Islam: An Alternative to Islamization and Ethnicity of Fear," in *The Other Muslims. Moderate and Secular*, Zeyno Baran, ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 157-74.

What are the characteristics of the Islam that Tibi calls "Euro-Islam"?

December 4 **Economic structures and challenges**

Stefano Battilossi, James Foreman-Peck, and Gerhard Kling, “Business cycles and economic policy, 1945–2007,” from *1870 to the Present*, Vol. 2 of *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe* (2010), 361-389.

Kozo Yamamura, “Germany and Japan in a New Phase of Capitalism: Confronting the Past and the Future,” from *The End of Diversity? : Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism*, ed. by Wolfgang Streeck, Kozo Yamamura (2003), 115-146.

Wolfgang Streeck, “Introduction: Explorations into the Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism in Germany and Japan,” in *The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism. Germany and Japan in Comparison*, ed. by Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura (Cornell University Press, 2001), 1-38.

Additional Statements

Health/Wellness Services:

Students who are in emotional/mental distress should refer to Mental Health Support at <https://www.uwo.ca/health/psych/index.html> for a complete list of options about how to obtain help.

Students seeking help regarding mental health concerns are advised to speak to someone they feel comfortable confiding in, such as their faculty supervisor, their program director (graduate chair), or other relevant administrators in their unit. Campus mental health resources may be found at http://www.health.uwo.ca/mental_health/resources.html

Accessibility Options:

Western is committed to achieving barrier-free accessibility for all its members, including graduate students. As part of this commitment, Western provides a variety of services devoted to promoting, advocating, and accommodating persons with disabilities in their respective graduate program. Graduate students with disabilities (for example, chronic illnesses, mental health conditions, mobility impairments) are strongly encouraged to register with Accessible Education Western (AEW), a confidential service designed to support graduate and undergraduate students through their academic program. With the appropriate documentation, the student will work with both AEW and their graduate programs (normally their Graduate Chair and/or Course instructor) to ensure that appropriate academic accommodations to program requirements are arranged. These accommodations include individual counselling, alternative formatted literature, accessible campus transportation, learning strategy instruction, writing exams and assistive technology instruction.

Request for Accommodations/Medical Issues:

Students are entitled to their privacy and consequently they do not need to disclose personal information to their course professors. In the event that students feel the need to discuss personal information, they should see the graduate chair. Unlike undergraduate students, graduate students cannot be referred to Social Science Academic Counselling to have their medical or non-medical circumstances evaluated and to receive a recommendation for accommodation. Those facilities are for undergraduates only, and there

is no process beyond the department to secure recommendations for accommodation. Our process is that faculty should deal with routine requests for extensions. However, a student's request for accommodation (on medical, non-medical, compassionate grounds) should go to the graduate chair, Prof. Francine McKenzie (historygradchair@uwo.ca) who will consult and communicate with faculty. Additionally, faculty and students should communicate with the grad chair about any case in which work is not submitted before grades are due. In the event that the graduate chair is also the course professor, then a request for accommodation can be taken to the department chair.

Statement on the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI):

Students may make use of AI in studying for the class. However, all written work should be the student's own, not copied or paraphrased from AI. All of the assigned written work is based on texts assigned for the course, and must reflect, respond to, or differ with, the arguments made in those texts.

Academic Offences:

Scholastic offences are taken seriously and students are directed to read the appropriate policy, specifically, the definition of what constitutes a Scholastic Offence, at the following Web site: http://www.uwo.ca/univsec/pdf/academic_policies/appeals/scholastic_discipline_grad.pdf.

All required papers may be subject to submission for textual similarity review to the commercial plagiarism detection software under license to the University for the detection of plagiarism. All papers submitted for such checking will be included as source documents in the reference database for the purpose of detecting plagiarism of papers subsequently submitted to the system. Use of the service is subject to the licensing agreement, currently between The University of Western Ontario and Turnitin.com (<http://www.turnitin.com>).

Statement on Gender-Based and Sexual Violence:

Western is committed to reducing incidents of gender-based and sexual violence (GBSV) and providing compassionate support to anyone who is going through or has gone through these traumatic events. If you are experiencing or have experienced GBSV (either recently or in the past), you will find information about support services for survivors, including emergency contacts at the following website: https://www.uwo.ca/health/student_support/survivor_support/get-help.html. To connect with a case manager or set up an appointment, please contact support@uwo.ca

NOTE: See Policies and Statements on the Graduate section of the History Department Website, https://history.uwo.ca/graduate/program_information/graduate_policies_and_statements.html. This includes additional information on academic support services for health and wellness and on other academic policies, including copyright, plagiarism, and accessibility.